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Bankruptcy Court Doors Swing Open For Cannabis Companies, But Just Slightly

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Are bankruptcy doors now opening for cannabis companies?  A decision last week from a California bankruptcy court indicates perhaps so, at least for cannabis companies that are no longer operating.

Factual Background

The Hacienda Company, LLC (the “Debtor”) was in the business of wholesale manufacturing and packaging cannabis products.  After it ceased operations in February 2021, the Debtor transferred its value, through the sale of intellectual property, to a publicly traded Canadian company, Lowell Farms, Inc. (“Lowell Farms”), receiving approximately 9% of Lowell Farms’ stock in consideration.  Lowell Farms’ sole business is cannabis growth and sales.

The Debtor filed its chapter 11 petition on September 21, 2022.  In response, the United States Trustee (the “UST”) filed a motion to dismiss the case for “cause” under section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, arguing that dismissal was required because: (a) the Debtor’s equity ownership in Lowell Farms violated the Controlled Substances Act (the “CSA”); (b) the Debtor is grossly mismanaging the estate because all of its assets are subject to forfeiture under the CSA; and (c) the Debtor filed its case in bad faith because any plan proposed by the Debtor would be funded from sources obtained in violation of the CSA.

The filing of the motion to dismiss could not have been a surprise to the Debtor given the general hostility of bankruptcy courts to cannabis debtors (see Cannabis and District Courts: Are Those Courthouse Doors Closed Too? | Restructuring GlobalView (restructuring-globalview.com, Cannabis and Bankruptcy: 2020 in Review | Restructuring GlobalView (restructuring-globalview.com, Up in Smoke: More Cannabis Companies Get Shut Out of Bankruptcy | Restructuring GlobalView (restructuring-globalview.com).  However, and most likely to the shock of both the Debtor and the UST, on December 21, 2022, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying the UST’s motion to dismiss, and on January 20, 2023, the bankruptcy court issued its memorandum opinion.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Opinion

In its opinion, the bankruptcy court began by explaining why violations of the CSA may constitute “cause” for dismissal.  The court specifically noted that such violations may evidence a lack of good faith and gross mismanagement of the estate, and further that CSA violations may warrant dismissal under general principals of equity.  However, the court recognized the admonition of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Burton, 610 B.R. 633, 637-638 (9th Cir. BAP 2020) that “the mere presence of marijuana near a bankruptcy case does not automatically prohibit a debtor from bankruptcy relief.”  The court also noted that it has “some degree of discretion” in considering dismissal, particularly when there are no ongoing postpetition violations of the CSA.  With these general principals in mind, the bankruptcy court examined the particular facts of the Debtor’s case.

First, the bankruptcy court rejected the UST’s argument that the Debtor’s ownership of the Lowell Farms stock constituted a violation of the CSA.  The UST argued that ownership of the stock violated section 856(a) of the CSA which makes it illegal to “profit from” a place used to manufacture, store, distribute or use cannabis.  Although it noted that the Debtor’s ownership of the stock put it in “uncomfortably close proximity to the cannabis industry,” the bankruptcy court held that the Debtor’s passive ownership of the stock, which it intended to liquidate to pay creditors, would terminate the Debtor’s connection with cannabis and was, in fact, the “opposite of an intent to profit from an ongoing scheme to distribute cannabis.”

Second, the bankruptcy court rejected the UST’s argument that the Debtor was violating the CSA by its postpetition use of the Lowell Farms stock or the stock proceeds.  Section 854 of the CSA makes it illegal for a person who has received income derived from a violation of the CSA to “use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise [engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce].”  Because the Debtor did not propose to use any of the stock or proceeds of the stock to invest in any cannabis enterprise but was instead proposing to sell the stock and distribute the proceeds to creditors, the court held that there was no violation of section 854.

Third, the bankruptcy court rejected the UST’s argument that any future bankruptcy trustee would have to engage in illegal activity if the Debtor was found to have cannabis or cannabis-related products.  The court noted that should such a contingency arise, a trustee could request the responsible federal authorities to dispose of the cannabis and, in an interesting aside, even hinted that a future trustee might have a duty to administer cannabis assets rather than simply turn the assets over to the federal authorities.  In short, based on the record before it, the bankruptcy court found that the UST had not satisfied its burden to show that any future trustee would have to violate the CSA.

Fourth, and perhaps most dramatically, the bankruptcy court rejected the concept of a “zero tolerance” policy under section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code for illegal conduct, including violations of the CSA. The court noted that interpreting “cause” under section 1112(b)(4) in such a way could prevent courts from considering a host of bankruptcy cases where there were prepetition violations of nonbankruptcy laws.  In fact, the court noted that some of the largest bankruptcy cases (e.g., Enron Corporation and Bernie Madoff) involved alleged or actual criminal liability and applying the UST’s argument to its natural conclusion would lead to the mandated dismissal of these cases.  The court reasoned that this would be contrary to the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of maximizing value for the benefit of creditors and preventing individual races to the courthouse.  In light of these concerns, the court adopted a middle ground in interpreting “cause,” writing:

[T]his Bankruptcy Court does not interpret Congress’ mandate that this Bankruptcy Court “shall” dismiss or convert a bankruptcy case for “cause” under § 1112(b) to mean that any violation of criminal law requires dismissal. Rather, this Court interprets the statute as giving discretion to determine whether dismissal is warranted based on all the facts and circumstances.

[T]his Bankruptcy Court interprets both § 1112(b) and the UST’s [motion to dismiss] as adopting a middle ground, under which this Bankruptcy Court must exercise its discretion to determine whether, given all the facts and circumstances, a debtor’s connection to cannabis profits and any past or future investment in cannabis enterprises warrants dismissal of this bankruptcy case.

Finally, the bankruptcy court held that even if the UST had established “cause”, there were “unusual circumstances” that prevented dismissal under section 1112(b)(2).  Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that the Debtor had divested itself, prepetition, of any direct involvement in the cannabis industry.  Further, the court found that there was a realistic possibility of a “substantial” distribution to creditors through the liquidation of the Lowell Farms stock.  Based on these facts, the court held that conversion or dismissal was not in the best interests of creditors.

Takeaways

Does the bankruptcy court’s opinion in Hacienda Company change the landscape for struggling cannabis companies?  Perhaps to some extent, particularly if the cannabis companies had shut down their cannabis businesses prepetition and are seeking to use Chapter 7 simply to liquidate their remaining assets.  In those cases, a court might be open to allowing the bankruptcy case to proceed.  Further, cannabis companies in need of bankruptcy relief should be heartened by the court’s conclusion that it would, in lieu or dismissal, “defer to prosecutors … to use their discretion about whether and how to address any violations of nonbankruptcy law.”

The larger, and so far unanswered, question is whether the bankruptcy court’s rationale in Hacienda Company, particularly its rejection of a “zero tolerance” policy and its asserted equivalence between violations of the CSA and other nonbankruptcy law, can be read to support more expansive uses of the Bankruptcy Code by cannabis companies.  For instance, can a cannabis company file bankruptcy to sell its assets (operating or not) under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code?  Can a cannabis company utilize chapter 11 to reorganize its affairs?  Can a foreign cannabis company utilize chapter 15 to seek U.S. recognition of a foreign insolvency proceeding?  Perhaps the only thing we know is that the UST will continue to oppose cannabis bankruptcies and that the outer boundaries of what is and is not permitted will continue to be litigated, at least until Congress removes cannabis from the list of controlled substances.

The UST has appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss.  We will monitor the appeal and update our post when a ruling has been issued.




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Minnesota Office of Cannabis Management Issues Rejections to Majority of Social Equity Applicants

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The Minnesota Office of Cannabis Management (“OCM”) has begun issuing final denials to the overwhelming majority of previously qualified social equity applicants (“SEA”s) ahead of its first statewide cannabis lottery on December 2 for 280 available “preapproval” cannabis licenses.

Flag of Minnesota in Marijuana leaf shape. The concept of legalization Cannabis in Minnesota. Medical cannabis illustration.

Per reporting from MJ Biz Daily, “The applicants who are barred from the lottery failed to complete the application process or acted improperly by submitting multiple applications or disguising the true investors in their companies, according to [OCM].” Obviously applying for more licenses than is allowed and/or concealing owners or financial interests are clear grounds for SEA application rejection. Other alleged “deficiencies” though may not be so cut and dry.

While state law does not permit appeals from denied applicants (which is not uncommon for states with cannabis licensing programs), impacted SEAs can still secure a review of their records submitted to the OCM within seven days of the rejection decision (by logging into their Accela Citizen Portal and pulling the internal record there).

The main issue emerging as a result of these rejections is the fact that the OCM did not consistently issue deficiency notices to rejected applicants if there was a material problem with their submitted applications (although as of October 16, the OCM had sent out deficiency notices to over 300 SEAs). In turn, there are instances here where SEAs were rejected for minor, seemingly non-material deficiencies in their applications (things like submitting incorrect corporate documentation that still contained the same information the OCM sought, or re-submitting documents upon request by the OCM only to be rejected for lack of the same document after-the-fact, or even blank denials altogether with no stated reason for rejection).

In an interview with the Brainerd Dispatch, Charlene Briner, the interim director of the OCM, cast these denied SEA applications into four categories:

  • Failure to meet the basic qualifying standards under state law (i.e., social equity applicant owning at least 65% of the business among others)
  • Failure to provide the requisite verification documents (i.e., legitimate business plans, source of funds, ID, etc.)
  • Hidden or inconsistent ownership or true parties of interest
  • Fraudsters (i.e., those trying to game the system by flooding it with multiple applications via proxy or otherwise by using the same address or phone number tied to the same person on multiple applications)

The first and second bullet points above are going to be the ripest ground for rejected SEAs to try to stop the OCM prior to the December 2 lottery, but that’s only if those rejected SEAs can very quickly obtain copies of their submitted documents (within 7 days of the rejection) and start the administrative litigation process and/or seek injunctive relief at the same time against the OCM.

What was once more than 1800 qualified social equity applicants for the lottery has been winnowed down to around 640. The OCM rejected applicants for a multitude of reasons, some of which are clearly legitimate and some of which appear to be questionably enforceable from the perspective of complying with Minnesota’s state constitution and its administrative procedure act.

If you’ve been impacted by an OCM rejection, you do not have much time to act ahead of the December 2 lottery. If you have questions about your potential civil or administrative claims against OCM due to a questionable SEA rejection, contact Jeffrey O’BrienHilary Bricken, or Nick Morgan.

Minnesota Office of Cannabis Management Issues Rejections to Majority of Social Equity Applicants



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Wait? My CBD Business May Be Racketeering? A Potential Existential Crisis We Have Been Warning About

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Even the most responsible hemp operator should understand that it operates in a world full of risk. But I doubt many of them believe they might be accused of racketeering. Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments about whether to sanction a commercial trucker’s attempt to bring a racketeering claim against CBD companies, whose allegedly mislabeled products the trucker claims led to his firing.

As always, Sam Reisman at Law360 distills the issue nicely:

The case concerns an allegation that companies sold CBD products with detectable amounts of THC, purportedly costing plaintiff Douglas J. Horn his job as a commercial trucker after he tested positive on a drug test. Oral arguments on Tuesday hinged largely on whether Horn’s claims stemmed from a personal injury — which would be excluded from the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO — or whether his firing was an economic injury and therefore redressable under RICO.

In taking the case, the U.S. Supreme Court could resolve a 3-2 circuit split over whether the civil prongs of the RICO statute allow a plaintiff to seek damages for economic harms stemming from injuries to their person.

Again, from Reisman:

During oral arguments on Tuesday, the liberal wing of the high court expressed skepticism with the CBD companies’ rendering of the case, which they said foregrounded Horn’s ingestion of the product as the source of the injury, as opposed to his firing for a positive drug test.

Lisa Blatt, an attorney for the CBD companies, told the justices that agreeing with Horn’s interpretation of the statute would open the door for virtually limitless personal injury cases under civil RICO, as long as plaintiffs could allege some connection between their ingestion of a product and a loss to their business or property: “Respondent’s rule also leaves the personal exclusion [in civil RICO] toothless, since virtually all personal injuries result in monetary loss,” Blatt said. “It is utterly implausible that Congress federalized every slip-and-fall involving RICO predicates. Personal injuries are serious and may support state tort claims, but they are not the stuff of RICO.”

On the other side, conservative justices attempted to discern how to draw a line between bona fide economic claims and personal injury claims pleaded as economic claims.

Easha Anand, arguing on behalf of Horn, said the vast majority of personal injury claims, such as those alleging pain and suffering or emotional distress, would still be excluded even if Horn was permitted to pursue his RICO claim against the CBD companies: “In your average slip-and-fall case, you’re not going to be able to prove a predicate act, let alone a pattern of predicate acts, let alone a pattern carried on through a racketeering enterprise,” Anand said.

Justice Neil Gorsuch observed, “There’s a failure to warn that this product contains ingredients that your client didn’t know about and should have known about and had a right to know about. I would have thought that that would have been kind of a classic personal injury.”

The Takeaway

This is pretty scary stuff for CBD and other hemp operators. RICO is no joke and carries very serious penalties (both civil and criminal depending on who is bringing the suit).

From the perspective of a CBD manufacturer, it seems unfair to hold the manufacturer responsible to control how its products are used and, as in this case, the implications of that use (here, an alleged economic injury).

If the Court rules that CBD and other hemp manufacturers are subject to RICO charges simply by selling their products to people who do things outside of the manufacturers’ control, it could pose an existential crisis to the industry with potentially unlimited civil (and maybe even criminal) liability. We have warned about this before.

That said, while it’s always difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will vote on any issue, I do not believe the Court will push the hemp industry to the brink. I suspect the Court will either rule that the claims in the present case are personal injury claims excluded from RICO and/or provide guidance for how lower courts should examine such “mixed” claims.

We’ll of course provide additional information once we hear from the Court. Stay tuned.



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What ‘material’ about therapeutic goods is considered advertising?

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It is important to note that advertising health services is subject to different regulations than advertising therapeutic products. Consequently, advertisers, manufacturers and sponsors must evaluate whether their business name could be interpreted as an advertisement for therapeutic goods. If so, they should consider whether the business name, including company or trading names, could be viewed as a ‘reference’ that draws the audience’s attention to medicinal cannabis, as any mention or similar terms to ‘cannabis’ are likely to have that effect. It is essential to recognise that the impact of promoting the use or supply of medicinal cannabis does not depend on a single promotional element but rather on the overall promotion. This includes all components of the promotional information and materials that accompany the name or branding. Advertising can result from the combination of separate statements, images or designs that collectively promote the use or supply of therapeutic goods.

Advertising

The prohibition on advertising medicinal cannabis to the public is determined by the context in which the material is perceived. When evaluating whether information about therapeutic goods qualifies as advertising, it is essential to consider the broader context of the material’s presentation. This encompasses various factors that influence the conveyed message, including the context of the information or activity, the intended audience and their likely interpretation of the message, as well as the presence of non-verbal and unwritten cues, such as visual elements. These factors can significantly affect communication and may alter the message perceived by consumers. 

For example, if an advertisement for a health service, such as a pain treatment service, includes references to medicinal cannabis, even in the company name or trading name, a reasonable consumer may conclude that the advertisement seeks to promote both the use of medicinal cannabis for pain relief and the pain treatment service itself. Including a disclaimer, such as advising the consumer to consult a health professional regarding suitable treatment options, does not exempt the advertiser from complying with legislative requirements.

The distinction between promoting a health service and the therapeutic product utilised in its delivery can be nuanced. Therefore, it is crucial for advertisers to consider how a typical consumer might perceive their advertisement in relation to the promotion of the therapeutic product.

Legal Compliance

To ensure legal compliance in promoting a business or service, advertisers should focus on the health services they provide and avoid referencing medicinal cannabis. For instance, stating “Our clinic offers consultations related to pain management” is a more compliant approach. The Therapeutic Goods Administration’s interpretation of advertising for medicinal cannabis is broad, covering all methods of promoting its use or supply. This includes company names, product names, abbreviations such as CBD and THC, colloquial terms, and any imagery related to cannabis. Any combination of statements or images that implies medicinal cannabis can be considered advertising, even in the absence of explicit promotional language.

Summary

In summary, it is prohibited to mention prescription medications in advertisements for therapeutic goods. If content discusses health conditions and consumers can reasonably infer, either from the context or through direct or indirect references, that medicinal cannabis or any other prescription medication is intended for use concerning these conditions, the content may be deemed an unlawful advertisement for therapeutic goods. Not all information related to therapeutic goods is classified as advertising. However, if the content aligns with the definition of ‘advertise’ as outlined in the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth)—which includes anything that is directly or indirectly intended to promote the use or supply of therapeutic goods—then the relevant legislative requirements for advertising such goods must be complied with.

“Indirect intent” in this context does not refer to the explicit intention of the party responsible for the content, but rather to what a reasonable consumer might infer as the intent behind the content. Terms such as “plant-based medicine,” “plant medicine,” “cannabidiol” and “CBD oil,” which relate to medical cannabis products, may be considered promotional if they suggest a connection to medicinal cannabis. Businesses promoting a health service must ensure they do not inadvertently advertise a prescription medicine in their marketing materials. If the consumer is encouraged to seek out a health service based on the therapeutic goods available, the content is likely to be regarded as an advertisement for those therapeutic goods.

For additional information, the Therapeutic Goods Administration has established the Medicinal Cannabis Hub, accessible at https://www.tga.gov.au/products/unapproved-therapeutic-goods/medicinal-cannabis-hub, and has also provided advertising guidance for businesses involved in the medicinal cannabis sector, which can be found at https://www.tga.gov.au/sites/default/files/advertising-guidance-businesses-involved-medicinal-cannabis-products.pdf. These resources are designed to assist both consumers and industry professionals in understanding their obligations.



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