Are bankruptcy doors now opening for cannabis companies? A decision last week from aCalifornia bankruptcy courtindicates perhaps so, at least for cannabis companies that are no longer operating.
Factual Background
The Hacienda Company, LLC (the “Debtor”) was in the business of wholesale manufacturing and packaging cannabis products. After it ceased operations in February 2021, the Debtor transferred its value, through the sale of intellectual property, to a publicly traded Canadian company, Lowell Farms, Inc. (“Lowell Farms”), receiving approximately 9% of Lowell Farms’ stock in consideration. Lowell Farms’ sole business is cannabis growth and sales.
The Debtor filed its chapter 11 petition on September 21, 2022. In response, the United States Trustee (the “UST”) filed a motion to dismiss the case for “cause” under section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, arguing that dismissal was required because: (a) the Debtor’s equity ownership in Lowell Farms violated the Controlled Substances Act (the “CSA”); (b) the Debtor is grossly mismanaging the estate because all of its assets are subject to forfeiture under the CSA; and (c) the Debtor filed its case in bad faith because any plan proposed by the Debtor would be funded from sources obtained in violation of the CSA.
In its opinion, the bankruptcy court began by explaining why violations of the CSA may constitute “cause” for dismissal. The court specifically noted that such violations may evidence a lack of good faith and gross mismanagement of the estate, and further that CSA violations may warrant dismissal under general principals of equity. However, the court recognized the admonition of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel inIn re Burton, 610 B.R. 633, 637-638 (9th Cir. BAP 2020) that “the mere presence of marijuana near a bankruptcy case does not automatically prohibit a debtor from bankruptcy relief.” The court also noted that it has “some degree of discretion” in considering dismissal, particularly when there are no ongoing postpetition violations of the CSA. With these general principals in mind, the bankruptcy court examined the particular facts of the Debtor’s case.
First, the bankruptcy court rejected the UST’s argument that the Debtor’s ownership of the Lowell Farms stock constituted a violation of the CSA. The UST argued that ownership of the stock violated section 856(a) of the CSA which makes it illegal to “profit from” a place used to manufacture, store, distribute or use cannabis. Although it noted that the Debtor’s ownership of the stock put it in “uncomfortably close proximity to the cannabis industry,” the bankruptcy court held that the Debtor’s passive ownership of the stock, which it intended to liquidate to pay creditors, would terminate the Debtor’s connection with cannabis and was, in fact, the “opposite of an intent to profit from an ongoing scheme to distribute cannabis.”
Second, the bankruptcy court rejected the UST’s argument that the Debtor was violating the CSA by its postpetition use of the Lowell Farms stock or the stock proceeds. Section 854 of the CSA makes it illegal for a person who has received income derived from a violation of the CSA to “use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise [engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce].” Because the Debtor did not propose to use any of the stock or proceeds of the stock to invest in any cannabis enterprise but was instead proposing to sell the stock and distribute the proceeds to creditors, the court held that there was no violation of section 854.
Third, the bankruptcy court rejected the UST’s argument that any future bankruptcy trustee would have to engage in illegal activity if the Debtor was found to have cannabis or cannabis-related products. The court noted that should such a contingency arise, a trustee could request the responsible federal authorities to dispose of the cannabis and, in an interesting aside, even hinted that a future trustee might have a duty to administer cannabis assets rather than simply turn the assets over to the federal authorities. In short, based on the record before it, the bankruptcy court found that the UST had not satisfied its burden to show that any future trustee would have to violate the CSA.
Fourth, and perhaps most dramatically, the bankruptcy court rejected the concept of a “zero tolerance” policy under section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code for illegal conduct, including violations of the CSA. The court noted that interpreting “cause” under section 1112(b)(4) in such a way could prevent courts from considering a host of bankruptcy cases where there were prepetition violations of nonbankruptcy laws. In fact, the court noted that some of the largest bankruptcy cases (e.g., Enron Corporation and Bernie Madoff) involved alleged or actual criminal liability and applying the UST’s argument to its natural conclusion would lead to the mandated dismissal of these cases. The court reasoned that this would be contrary to the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of maximizing value for the benefit of creditors and preventing individual races to the courthouse. In light of these concerns, the court adopted a middle ground in interpreting “cause,” writing:
[T]his Bankruptcy Court does not interpret Congress’ mandate that this Bankruptcy Court “shall” dismiss or convert a bankruptcy case for “cause” under § 1112(b) to mean that any violation of criminal lawrequiresdismissal. Rather, this Court interprets the statute as giving discretion to determine whether dismissal is warranted based on all the facts and circumstances.
…
[T]his Bankruptcy Court interprets both § 1112(b) and the UST’s [motion to dismiss] as adopting a middle ground, under which this Bankruptcy Court must exercise its discretion to determine whether, given all the facts and circumstances, a debtor’s connection to cannabis profits and any past or future investment in cannabis enterprises warrants dismissal of this bankruptcy case.
Finally, the bankruptcy court held that even if the UST had established “cause”, there were “unusual circumstances” that prevented dismissal under section 1112(b)(2). Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that the Debtor had divested itself, prepetition, of any direct involvement in the cannabis industry. Further, the court found that there was a realistic possibility of a “substantial” distribution to creditors through the liquidation of the Lowell Farms stock. Based on these facts, the court held that conversion or dismissal was not in the best interests of creditors.
Takeaways
Does the bankruptcy court’s opinion inHacienda Companychange the landscape for struggling cannabis companies? Perhaps to some extent, particularly if the cannabis companies had shut down their cannabis businesses prepetition and are seeking to use Chapter 7 simply to liquidate their remaining assets. In those cases, a court might be open to allowing the bankruptcy case to proceed. Further, cannabis companies in need of bankruptcy relief should be heartened by the court’s conclusion that it would, in lieu or dismissal, “defer to prosecutors … to use their discretion about whether and how to address any violations of nonbankruptcy law.”
The larger, and so far unanswered, question is whether the bankruptcy court’s rationale inHacienda Company, particularly its rejection of a “zero tolerance” policy and its asserted equivalence between violations of the CSA and other nonbankruptcy law, can be read to support more expansive uses of the Bankruptcy Code by cannabis companies. For instance, can a cannabis company file bankruptcy to sell its assets (operating or not) under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code? Can a cannabis company utilize chapter 11 to reorganize its affairs? Can a foreign cannabis company utilize chapter 15 to seek U.S. recognition of a foreign insolvency proceeding? Perhaps the only thing we know is that the UST will continue to oppose cannabis bankruptcies and that the outer boundaries of what is and is not permitted will continue to be litigated, at least until Congress removes cannabis from the list of controlled substances.
The UST has appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss. We will monitor the appeal and update our post when a ruling has been issued.
In the years since the 2018 Farm Bill became federal law, a burgeoning industry of hemp-infused THC beverages has proliferated throughout the country, including in Kentucky. The 2018 Farm Bill legalized the domestic production of hemp and protected hemp and hemp products in interstate commerce. Likewise, Kentucky law has—for years—broadly allowed retail sales of hemp products, including food and beverages with hemp-derived THC.
Some states, however, perceive the 2018 Farm Bill to have created a legal loophole that allows hemp products with intoxicating amounts of THC to be sold, despite the 2018 Farm Bill’s restriction that hemp may not contain more than 0.3% delta-9 THC on a dry weight basis. To close the loophole, states have enacted laws or implemented regulations banning certain hemp products with intoxicating amounts of THC or restricting such products to adult-use channels like licensed alcohol stores or cannabis dispensaries.
Kentucky appeared poised to do the same when state Senator Julie Raque Adams introduced Senate Bill (SB) 202, which would have placed a one-year moratorium on the sale of hemp-infused THC beverages while the state developed a regulatory regime. Hemp beverage manufacturers and other hemp industry stakeholders loudly and quickly voiced opposition, arguing for narrower means than banning all sales. The next day, Senator Adams filed a floor amendment that removed the moratorium and instead imposed the three-tiered regulatory system that exists for alcohol.
The three-tiered regulatory system that will apply if the bill becomes law has robust requirements, including licensing, shipping, and signature-on-delivery requirements. Additionally, hemp beverages will be limited to five milligrams of intoxicating cannabinoids per serving and may only be sold or consumed by persons 21 years of age or older. Beverages that exceed the cannabinoid limit could be legally sold until May 1, 2025.
The Senate approved the floor amendment. The House passed a committee substitute retaining the Senate floor amendment’s provisions but that extends the sell-through provision until June 1, 2025, and makes the five-milligram per serving limit applicable per every 12-ounce serving. The House committee substitute allows hemp beverages to be sold at fairs, festivals, and similar events. The Senate concurred with the House’s version, and Governor Beshear received the bill to sign into law or veto.
Although SB 202 eschews a ban against hemp-infused THC beverages, it creates strict regulations that differ significantly from the current regulatory regime for hemp beverages, while also directing state agencies to develop further regulations. Ongoing compliance by manufacturers, distributors, and retailers will be critical.
In addition to SB 202, the House and Senate passed House Bill (HB) 775, which sets tax rates for hemp-infused THC beverages. The taxes must be paid and reported by both manufacturers and distributors. Among other provisions, the bill requires manufacturers to obtain a food manufacturer permit from the Department for Public Health and to register with the Department of Revenue, and requires sellers to obtain a retail package, distributor, or direct shipper license. HB 775 is headed to Governor Beshear’s desk.
As a nationally preeminent and leading firm for hemp legal and regulatory services, Frost Brown Todd is well positioned to assist hemp manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in navigating applicable federal and state laws. For more information about SB 202 or HB 775, or their implications for hemp beverages sold in Kentucky, please contact the author or any other attorney with Frost Brown Todd’s Consumable Goods Team.
You can also visit our Hemp Legally Speaking Blog for more insight into the legal and operational issues unique to the industrial hemp, CBD, and hemp-derived THC marketplaces.
As federal cannabis banking reform remains stalled, states have begun taking independent action to address the capital access crisis for cannabis businesses. While some states like Illinois, Maryland, New York, and Virginia have created state-backed cannabis lending programs, others have taken different approaches, ranging from self-administered programs with no external banking involvement to state protections for financial institutions but no direct state capital support. This mishmash of approaches leaves both Social Equity Cannabis businesses vulnerable to predatory lenders and financial instability and Corporate Cannabis businesses without debt-financed lending options.
This article breaks down state cannabis banking laws, highlighting:
Which states provide structured lending and financing support.
How different states approach social equity financing.
Key differences in state banking statutes and what needs improvement.
1. How States Approach Cannabis Banking & Lending
Since federal banks and credit unions remain hesitant to lend, state governments have adopted various models to facilitate financial access for cannabis licensees.
Four Common Models of State Cannabis Banking & Lending
✅ Model 1: State-Backed Cannabis Lending Programs (Best Practice) These states use cannabis tax revenue to fund capital access programs, creating low-interest or zero-interest loan funds and encouraging banks to participate through loan guarantees and risk-sharing mechanisms.
Examples: Illinois, Maryland, New York, Virginia
Best for: Social equity and minority-owned cannabis businesses needing fair access to financing.
✅ Model 2: State Self-Administered Loan & Grant Programs Without External Bank Partnerships Some states allocate funding for social equity applicants but do not involve external banks, credit unions, or CDFIs in the process. These programs:
Provide a limited total amount of funding per year, which must be replenished through annual appropriations.
Cap the maximum funding available per business.
Do not address the need for long-term lending partnerships that could expand financing options.
Examples: Connecticut, Michigan, Massachusetts, Colorado, New Jersey, New York
Best for: Short-term relief but not a scalable lending solution for long-term business growth.
✅ Model 3: State Legal Protections for Banks Without Direct State Capital Support These states allow banks, credit unions, and CDFIs to serve cannabis businesses without fear of state-level penalties, but they do not provide direct state financial backing for loans or banking relationships. As a result:
Banks must still manage all compliance risks independently, limiting participation.
No state-backed loan guarantees, lending facilities, or grant programs exist to make cannabis lending more attractive.
Only the most risk-tolerant financial institutions choose to engage with cannabis businesses.
Examples: California, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Rhode Island, Texas, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Ohio, Missouri, South Dakota
Best for: Encouraging some legal banking relationships but fails to ensure broad financial access for cannabis businesses.
✅ Model 4: No State-Level Banking Protections for Cannabis Businesses Some states have legalized cannabis but have not enacted statutory protections for banks or credit unions working with marijuana-related businesses. As a result:
Financial institutions in these states face higher risks when serving cannabis businesses.
No clear legal framework exists to shield banks from potential enforcement actions.
Cannabis businesses in these states remain almost entirely cash-based, increasing security risks and limiting growth.
Example: Louisiana
Worst for: Any cannabis business seeking financial services.
2. State-by-State Breakdown of Cannabis Banking & Lending Programs
Illinois: The Gold Standard for State Cannabis Lending
Best for: Social Equity & Minority-Owned Cannabis Businesses Banking Model:State-Backed Lending & Capital Access Program
The Community Invest – Cannabis Banking Services Program provides state-backed capital to banks and credit unions, enabling them to offer low-cost banking services to cannabis businesses.
The Cannabis Social Equity Loan Program offers low- or no-interest loans to social equity applicants, helping minority businesses establish themselves in the market.
Illinois’s Cannabis Loan Program uses
The Illinois Finance Authority administers state-funded loans and subsidizes loans through qualified Banks, Credit Unions and CDFI’s, prioritizing businesses in disproportionately impacted areas.
Maryland: A Strong Model with Loan Loss Reserve Protection
Best for: Small & Medium-Scale Cannabis Businesses Banking Model:State Loan Loss Reserve & Lending Program
Maryland’s Capital Access Program (Subtitle 14, Chapter 26 of 2022) provides loan loss reserve accounts for banks that lend to social equity cannabis businesses.
The state allows dispensaries to apply for loans up to $500,000 and growers/processors up to $1 million, reducing financial barriers.
Best for: Justice-Impacted & Minority Entrepreneurs Banking Model:State-Facilitated Loan Fund & Private Investment Pool
New York’s Social Equity Cannabis Fund is structured to provide financial backing to social equity licensees.
The state works with private financial institutions and impact investors to co-fund cannabis business loans.
Loan repayment structures are designed to minimize early financial strain, helping startups succeed.
Virginia: A Developing State Banking Model
Best for: New Market Entrants & Small-Scale Cannabis Businesses Banking Model:State-Led Lending Initiative
Virginia’s State Cannabis Lending Initiative is has not started due to obstruction from Governor Youngkin rejecting the second State legalization bill in 2024 and 2025 but is modeled after Illinois & Maryland.
The state intends to offer cannabis business loans backed by state funds both directly and through Community Development Financial Institutions and Banks, supporting social equity businesses.
3. Where Other States Are Falling Short
Model 2 States: Self-Administered, Limited Loan & Grant Programs
Connecticut, Michigan, Massachusetts, Colorado and New Jersey provide funding for cannabis businesses but do not involve financial institutions, creating short-term solutions but no long-term lending structures.
Colorado self administers their lending program through the Office of Economic Development & International Trade
Model 3 States: State Protections Without Capital Support
California, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Rhode Island, Texas, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Ohio, Missouri, South Dakota have legal protections for banks working with cannabis businesses but no direct lending or grant programs.
Model 4 States: No Legal Banking Protections
Louisiana has no banking protections for financial institutions, making cannabis businesses in the state almost entirely cash based.
4. The Path Forward: Expanding State-Level Lending Programs
As more states legalize cannabis, the best way to ensure equitable access to capital is to create structured lending programs that involve banks, credit unions, and CDFIs. States that only provide self-administered grants or legal protections for banks are not doing enough to ensure sustainable cannabis financing.
By following the models set by Illinois and Maryland, states can:
✅ Create state-backed cannabis lending facilities using cannabis tax revenues.
✅ Offer loan guarantees to banks and credit unions to reduce lending risks.
The Illinois Cannabis Capital Investment eco-system
✅ Adopt compliance & underwriting frameworks like the Bank Black Initiative & Cannabis Compliance Banking Solution to support financial institutions.
How Bank Black & Cannabis Compliance Banking Can Help
Cannas Capital’s Bank Black Initiative and Cannabis Compliance Banking & Capital Solution offer: ✅ AI-driven underwriting to de-risk cannabis loans. ✅ Regulatory compliance monitoring for banks & state agencies. ✅ Social equity-focused lending frameworks to ensure minority-owned businesses have fair access to capital.
Final Thoughts: Why State-Led Action is Necessary
The federal government isn’t moving on cannabis banking reform anytime soon. That means states must take the lead in creating sustainable, scalable lending programs for cannabis businesses. Expanding access to capital is not just about financing cannabis businesses—it’s about ensuring that social equity applicants and minority-owned companies have the same opportunities to succeed as well-capitalized corporate players.
With models like Illinois, Maryland, and New York, we already see effective solutions that prioritize social equity financing. The next step is expanding these programs to more states—and integrating compliance-driven solutions like the Bank Black Initiative to make them even stronger.